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Post-Truth, Common Worlds and Critical Politics: Critiquing Bruno Latour’s Critique of 
Critique 
Eva Giraud and Sarah-Nicole Aghassi-Isfahani 
In the wake of broader questions about how to overcome the (alleged) destabilization of truth 
within political life, a number of commentators have questioned the position of critical 
thought. What has emerged is effectively a re-articulation of the 1990s science wars, where 
critique in general, work from a poststructuralist tradition in particular, and – more 
specifically still – theoretical perspectives concerned with gender and racial inequality, have 
been seen as contributing to a relativization of facts and expert knowledge.1 Particular 
concern has been raised about the place of Science and Technology Studies (STS), a field 
central to the previous iteration of the science wars, which has been dedicated to critically 
interrogating the construction of knowledge. As a result, a range of articles and think-pieces 
have emerged, with the aim of defending contemporary STS against allegations that it has 
contributed to an erosion of public faith in facts (e.g. Collins and Evans, 2017; Jasanoff and 
Simmet, 2017; Lynch, 2017; Sismondo, 2017).  
The backdrop to these events is the series of cultural developments frequently referred to as 
“post-truth,” wherein “the relationship between emotion and politics has become front and 
center” (Boler and Davis, 2018: 78) and “objective facts are less influential in shaping public 
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Oxford Living Dictionaries 2017). As 
indicated by the OED’s definition of post-truth (which was much-cited after becoming their 
2016 word of the year), despite widespread wariness of the value of the label, it became a 
defining catchword of the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign and subsequently the 
current presidency. Thus, though a number of texts have hinted at the broader history of the 
term or pointed out that the propagation of disinformation by elite political groups is far from 
novel (Stenmark, Fuller and Zackariasson, 2018; Fuller, 2019), post-truth is nonetheless 
commonly perceived as a contemporary phenomenon associated with “accusations of 
recurrent lies and false promises in the Trump and Brexit campaigns” (Lynch, 2017: 594).  
Although “post-truth” has become less of a buzzword over recent months, debates about the 
role of facts in public life have persisted and the consequences of these developments for 
critical thought remain significant. Some particularly provocative issues have emerged from a 
small – but increasingly prominent – body of work, which has argued that public faith in 
expert knowledge can only be regained not through reasserting the authority of facts but by 
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rediscovering ways of knowing-in-common. Sujatha Raman, for instance, troubles the 
assumption it has ever been possible to translate truth-claims straight-forwardly into policy, 
as this assumption ignores the complexity of knowledge and the necessary role of value-
judgement in determining how any given piece of information is acted upon. As she 
succinctly puts it:  
…fact-checking only works within a narrow framework in which the issue at 
stake is what science can tell us about this or that hazardous chemical substance, 
and what this means for regulation. It does not address long-standing 
challenges such as the capacity to assess chemical mixtures in the real world, 
where the threshold of exposure to hazard should be set, on whom the epistemic 
burden of evidence of hazard should be placed, or assumptions about behaviour 
embedded in regulatory standards which are difficult to meet in practice. (2017: 
NP) 
What is needed, for Raman, is to recognize the way that social and cultural values necessarily 
shape the implementation of knowledge. Post-truth, in other words, is not a problem that can 
be dealt with by reasserting the primacy of “facts” over “emotion,” instead it is important to 
develop “connective truths” (Raman, 2017) that are grounded in “a more inclusive culture of 
deliberation” (Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017: 763) and create space to ask “whose definition of 
risk or benefit should frame the public discourse” (Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017: 761).  
These thinkers are not alone in working to move beyond bifurcations between facts and 
value, truth and emotion, and here we focus on a figure who has taken this line of argument 
in a very particular direction: Bruno Latour. Latour, similarly, argues that addressing the 
problem of post-truth is less “a matter of learning how to repair cognitive deficiencies” (on 
the part of those who believe disinformation) but of instead rediscovering “how to live in the 
same world” (2018: 25). His arguments, however, depart from aforementioned work that has 
called for a renewed emphasis on connective truths. Latour’s work instead needs to be 
situated as part of a longer series of arguments against other theoretical perspectives – not 
just within STS but cultural theory more broadly – which have offered critical appraisals of 
knowledge-production.  
In light of Latour’s longstanding critique of critique we argue here that, while his push to find 
alternative orientations for politics is important, other aspects of his arguments for reclaiming 
common worlds can perpetuate broader attacks on marginalized perspectives. More 
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specifically, this renewed critique of critique is in danger of undermining scholarship with 
feminist, anti-racist, post- and de-colonial commitments. Building on Maria Puig de la 
Bellacasa’s (2011, 2016) sympathetic, but critical, engagement with Latour’s previous work, 
this paper elucidates the danger of Latour’s specific emphasis on reclaiming a common world 
that can sustain facts if this emphasis reinforces the exclusion of critical perspectives that are 
necessary in offering divergent visions of this world. The stakes of this argument have been 
heightened by recent political developments: Given that racial, gender, and sexual 
inequalities are precisely what are being reinscribed by the populist right, it is important that 
contemporary theoretical work does not inadvertently compound these inequalities.  
This argument is approached in three parts. Firstly we outline existing debates that have 
emerged in the wake of post-truth, drawing on an example of an online disinformation 
campaign that elucidates these tensions. We then, secondly, discuss how Latour’s recent 
work is framed (by Latour himself and others) as a productive middle ground, which offers a 
path through existing debates. The paper culminates by elucidating two particular problems 
with Latour’s approach: the political implications of his critique of critique in the 
contemporary moment, and the way that any negative consequences of this critique are 
treated as inevitable and unavoidable. When the Earth itself necessitates existing strands of 
critical thought to be swept aside, any concerns about this move are rendered not only 
undesirable but out of touch with material reality.   
Post truth and “epistemic relativism” 
In September 2016 a disinformation campaign against Hillary Clinton grew to prominence, 
which circulated rumours about the presidential candidate’s health that were difficult to 
dispel, even after releasing medical information that should have debunked them. Though an 
evocative case in itself, this example is also informative for mapping out key points of 
tension between thinkers who are committed to particular traditions of critical thought and 
those who see critique as itself constituting the problem.  
In the weeks before the presidential election a series of memes emerged about Clinton after 
she left the 9/11 memorial service at Ground Zero early. A video captured Clinton’s aides 
helping her into a car as she appeared to stumble, with a screenshot of this moment then 
circulating accompanied by speculation about Clinton’s health. The Clinton campaign 
responded rapidly, disclosing that she was suffering from “walking pneumonia” and 
emphasising the comparative mildness of the condition (Fox, 2016). Attempts to dispel 
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rumours about Clinton’s health, however, did not prevent the further proliferation of stories 
that were leveraged in support of a broader narrative portraying her as unable to fulfil the role 
of president. Prior to the memorial service Trump supporters had already seized on a 
coughing fit Clinton had experienced during an interview as evidence of her “frailty” and 
pro-Trump websites cited photos of Clinton tripping upstairs, taken six months before the 
memorial, as evidence of long-term health problems. These disparate stories eventually 
converged as a series of memes under the umbrella “Weekend at Hillary’s,” and 
#Hillaryshealth started to trend on Twitter. The #Hillaryshealth narrative provided a backdrop 
to Trump’s own criticism of Clinton’s strength, articulated in the first presidential debate: “I 
don’t believe she has the stamina, to be president of this country you need tremendous 
stamina” (in Blake, 2016). 
A superficial reading of these memes could interpret them as reflecting a crisis of expertise, 
bearing out the argument that in order to combat disinformation it is vital to reinstate faith in 
facts. The circulation and proliferation of rumours about Clinton’s health resonates with 
concern that scientific knowledges are becoming treated as just another discourse amongst 
many, without any privileged claim upon truth. Fact-checking website Snopes, for instance, 
worked to contest rumours about Clinton’s health by picking apart evidence offered by 
“armchair” diagnoses and reasserting counter-evidence offered by medical professionals 
(Snopes, ND). Clinton’s team adopted similar tactics, releasing her medical records in order 
to debunk claims made about her health, which included a list of medications such as 
Warfarin, Clarinex for allergies, and vitamin B-12, and a thyroid hormone to control her 
underactive gland (Altman, 2016). Even though most of these medications were routine, 
rather than shutting down debate the release of this information caused rumours about 
Clinton’s health to intensify, with online stories such as “Hillary Clinton taking ‘risky rat 
poison’ medication for blood clotting woes” (Torres, 2016). Appeals to evidence on the part 
of the Clinton campaign, Snopes, and other fact-checking sites can be contrasted with the 
tactics adopted by the Trump campaign, which released a doctor’s letter (subsequently 
revealed as a fabrication) that described results from a recent medical examination as 
“astonishingly excellent,” labelled his “strength and physical stamina” as “extraordinary,” 
and concluded by stating that Trump “will be the healthiest individual ever elected to the 
presidency” (in Barnes, 2018).  
#Hillaryshealth thus appears to fit neatly with narratives that have been propagated by a 
number of popular science commentators, wherein the difficulty of dispelling disinformation 
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by appealing to factual evidence speaks to the culmination of issues that came to light during 
the 1990s science wars, with “epistemic relativism” or “postmodernism” argued to have laid 
the groundwork for public suspicion of facts (cf Fitzgerald, 2017). Columnist Ben Goldacre 
(2016) puts things in especially hyperbolic terms, positing that: “20 years after the Sokal 
hoax […] the left created the post truth virus whose apocalypse we inhabit.”2 A similar line 
of argument is taken by a think-piece by Daniel Dennett: “I think what the postmodernists did 
was truly evil. They are responsible for the intellectual fad that made it respectable to be 
cynical about truth and facts. You’d have people going around saying: ‘Well, you’re part of 
that crowd who still believe in facts’” (Dennett, 2017). Kenan Malik offers a more nuanced 
analysis, but nonetheless argues that:  
…sections of academia and of the left have in recent decades helped create a 
culture in which relativised views of facts and knowledge seem untroubling, and 
hence made it easier for the reactionary right not just to re-appropriate but also to 
promote reactionary ideas. It is also that, having spent decades promoting 
relativism and the politics of identity, the left is in no position to challenge the 
identitarian right. (Malik, 2016) 
As reflected most vividly by the so-called “Sokal Squared” hoax, a heterogeneous body of 
work has routinely been gathered together by critics under labels such as “postmodernism” or 
“identity politics” and depicted as contributing to a political environment where all language 
is seen as relative and appeals to objective facts displaced by a proliferation of individual 
opinions.3  
Straight-forward cause and effect narratives that have placed responsibility for post-truth on 
cultural theory, however, have been criticised, in turn, by work in the social sciences and 
humanities, which has suggested these narratives paint a somewhat reductive picture of 
critical and cultural theory; as Uday Jain (2017) puts it:  
In this story, somehow simultaneously, Stuart Hall, Selma James, Silvia Federici, 
Robin D. G. Kelley, Judith Butler, and scores of other leading Leftists around the 
world nefariously invented post-modernism to fit the ideological requirements of 
neoliberalism and thus convinced their many students to stop fighting capital and 
instead take up fighting endless social media wars about culture and popular 
representations of identity. 
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Others have gone further, arguing that this homogenization and dismissal of critique is not 
only problematic but counter-productive, as critical perspectives provide precisely the tools 
that are necessary to unpick the “post-truth phenomenon” (Boler and Davis, 2018; Giraud, 
2017; Marres, 2018; McPherson, 2015, 2016).4 Noortje Marres (2018), for example, details 
how technical solutions, which are currently being devised to counter post-truth, rely on AI 
technofixes that presume the problem lies in the content of social media posts and assume 
solutions can be found in software that neatly parses fact from fiction. Aside from prominent 
work that has foregrounded the lack of neutrality of algorithms themselves (Noble, 2018) – 
and questioned whether this neutral parsing is even possible – Marres points out that 
technical solutions misdiagnose the problem by attributing it to misleading content, rather 
than the socio-technical processes through which his content is circulated and enabled to gain 
political purchase. In addition, seeing fact-checking itself as the solution:  
…risks reinforcing stereotypical oppositions between those who are trained to be 
discerning and those who are not, between those capable of knowledge and the 
others. Worryingly, the distinction between knowledge and non-knowledge 
roughly maps onto a polarity that defines today’s political force fields, namely the 
opposition between educated progressives and, on balance, less educated 
supporters of populist and nationalist causes… (Marres, 2018: 429-30) 
The perpetuation of these hierarchies, therefore, is not just strategically dangerous – in 
playing into the hands of a populist critique of experts as trying to impose their own 
definitions of issues and neglecting public concerns – but carries a distinct epistemic politics. 
Ella McPherson’s (2015, 2016) work, reveals the sakes of this problem in illustrating 
pressures upon NGOs to create norms about what constitutes truth, in a desire to ensure the 
evidence they use is credible. Her work offers a reminder that what is often consecrated in 
fact-checking activities is not just the legitimacy of certain forms of knowledge, but the 
institutions or individuals who are culturally held up as gatekeepers of this knowledge. The 
specific danger for human rights organisations is that this can lead to the exclusion of 
evidence that doesn’t conform to particular assumptions about what reliable information 
“looks like,” which has in practice led to the marginalization of perspectives with alternative 
storytelling traditions and exclusion of particular forms of testimony.5 As McPherson 
describes, moreover, the desire to establish particular institutions as reliable gatekeepers has 
not only benefitted NGOs but mainstream media institutions that are seen as the arbiters of 
truth (as with the New York Times’s famous “Trump bump”).6  
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Revisiting #Hillaryshealth underlines these arguments; in this instance, again, appeal to 
“facts” appears to have been insufficient in combatting disinformation and instead shored up 
dangerous epistemic hierarchies. In this case it was not just newspapers such as the New York 
Times that benefitted from emergent distinctions between “unreliable” social media and 
“established” mainstream media. News outlets that actively propagated xenophobic narratives 
and lent support to populism have, similarly, appealed to “fake news” in order to reinforce 
their own legitimacy. Right wing UK newspaper The Daily Mail, for example, labelled online 
discussion of Clinton’s body double as irrational conspiracy theory on the part of “right wing 
websites” (Quinn, 2016). This positioning of longstanding news sources as more reliable than 
unverified online materials depoliticizes the role of particular strands of the mainstream 
media, obscuring its own role in laying the ground-work for the current political climate, 
through normalizing xenophobic and misogynist sentiment.  
In the case of #Hillaryshealth, for instance, the durability of health rumours in the face of 
expert knowledge was not just born of a sudden lack of faith in expertise that needs to be 
redressed. Instead these developments should be positioned in relation to the construction and 
composition of longstanding gendered discourses and practices of healthcare: where the 
medicalisation of the menopause (Bell, 1987), is entangled with constructions of feminine 
frailty (Russell, 2007) that are in turn perpetuated within the mainstream media (Hancock, 
2016). Rather than attributing the persistence of disinformation to an epistemic relativism 
born of “postmodernism,” it is more fruitful to reflect on how pre-existing discourses within 
the mainstream media give rumours an air of plausibility. Approaching #Hillarysheath from 
this lens illustrates how, in certain contexts, the release of factual information does not dispel 
norms but compounds existing inequalities. In a terrain already shaped by neoliberal 
discourses of health as a personal responsibility (or personal failing) the release of medical 
information supports overarching neoliberal narratives about health as a personal 
responsibility whilst naturalising the differential gendered burden of this responsibility.  
What #Hillaryshealth helps to elucidate, therefore, are some of the key tensions that have 
characterized debates about the relationship between post-truth and critical thought. On the 
one hand, certain commentators conflate poststructuralism with epistemic relativism (and see 
it as somehow culpable for undermining faith in facts and expert knowledge). This line of 
argument clashes with those who, on the other hand, contend that it is a narrow insistence on 
reasserting the “facts” can actually obscure and compound the conditions that enable 
disinformation to flourish and that critical thought provides precisely the tools needed to 
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understand these conditions. The problem is that due to holding different commitments, 
coming from different disciplinary contexts, or – in some instances – due to being forced to 
defend themselves from attack, perspectives on different sides of this debate tend to speak 
past one another. It is as a means of negotiating these debates that a different approach has 
gained visibility as a sort of “third path,” as epitomised by Latour’s argument that a re-
assertion of facts is doomed to fail without a shared political horizon. In the rest of this paper 
we sketch out the response offered by this third path before offering notes of caution about 
what is in danger of being foreclosed by this approach.  
Reclaiming common worlds 
For Latour the types of debate outlined above are misguided in being overly preoccupied with 
the symptoms of much broader developments, developments that are not just “political” but 
climatic. His stance has gained visibility not just through his recent academic work in this 
area (such as 2018’s Down to Earth) but within the popular media. The LA Review of Books 
for instance states that “no one has thought more compellingly than Latour about the problem 
of how to retool the authority of the sciences to fight the new Information Wars, or about how 
to move people to passionate engagement with ecological questions” (Delbourgo, 2018). The 
by-line of a New York Times Magazine profile of Latour, similarly, labels him the “post-truth 
philosopher” who “spent decades deconstructing the ways that scientists claim their 
authority” but could help them “regain that authority today” (Kofman, 2018). 
Latour’s work, therefore, is explicitly situated in relation to concerns (as articulated by 
popular science commentators) about the place of theoretical and social scientific work that 
has emphasised the situatedness of knowledge. As Latour himself puts it:  
I think we were so happy to develop all this critique because we were so sure of 
the authority of science … [a]nd that the authority of science would be shared 
because there was a common world … Now we have people who no longer share 
the idea that there is a common world. And that of course changes everything. 
(Latour, in Kofman, 2018) 
The subsequent thumbnail sketch of Latour’s work, which is offered by the NYT Magazine, 
fleshes out this apparent shift in his conceptual emphasis. Simply put, Latour is described as 
moving away from an examination of how facts are constructed, to offering sociological 
explanations for why they are not taken up and how they can regain authority. What is hinted 
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at here is thus a gradual departure from commitments of texts such as Science in Action 
(1987) with its focus on how techniques such as graphs and statistics work to “black-box” 
research in order to lend it authority; or actor-network theory’s redistribution of agency (e.g. 
Latour, 2005) wherein the properties even of entities that seem objective – from microbes 
(1993) to speed bumps (1994) – are product of co-constitutive relations between the social 
and the technical.  
Perhaps the most significant aspect of how Latour’s recent work has been framed, however, 
is an apparent epistemological move away from We Have Never Been Modern’s (1993) 
unpicking of Enlightenment narratives of rationality. His recent work is presented as 
departing from this form of critique, instead charting how the rise of populism is bound up 
with a crisis in Enlightenment progress, with the aim of offering tools for negotiating this 
crisis. As Latour suggests: “There is no longer a shared horizon” from which to orient 
political decision-making (2018: 32) and an alternative horizon now needs to be “mapped out 
anew” in order to reclaim ways of knowing-in-common (2018: 33).   
The trajectory presented by these recent depictions of Latour’s work is, despite appearances, 
not novel or reflective of a shift in his approach in response to this political moment. Latour’s 
much-cited 2004 essay “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” for instance, offers a similar 
sense that he is reconciling with the scientific community and renouncing particular forms of 
critique. Like his more recent sentiments, this earlier essay seems to offer a reflexive 
criticism of Latour’s own position in a context where the relativization of knowledge has 
been mobilized by climate change sceptics. The approach Latour offers as an alternative is 
again framed as a middle ground: a constructivism that respects the work involved in 
rendering facts durable and aims to “add” rather than “subtract” reality to these concerns 
(Latour, 2004: 232). 
While Latour presents the essay as a departure from his existing approach, it is important to 
recognize that it is more of a reframing. In “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?” the 
approach he ultimately advocates is an ongoing emphasis on the messy “web of associations” 
(Latour, 2004: 237) that create particular realities in order “to detect how many participants 
are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its existence” (Latour, 2004: 246). 
This approach, in other words, holds much in common with Latour’s previous work, with its 
emphasis on describing the relations between human and nonhuman actors that constitute a 
given phenomenon. Yet, while – despite superficial appearances – Latour is not recuperating 
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an empiricism that reinstates expert authority and undeniable facts, his approach is 
nonetheless framed in a way that is palatable for those who do have these commitments.  
This re-articulation of Latour’s approach in order to create the impression of a middle ground 
is not necessarily problematic in itself. Indeed his arguments promise a means of moving 
beyond (often circular) debates between work from a poststructuralist lineage and those 
advocating a return to the “facts.” The issue is that Latour’s re-framing (and impression of 
compromise) relies on setting his stance against other forms of cultural theory. As with 
Latour’s previous work, his recent approach is explicitly set against so-called “critical” 
thought, relying on a: “fundamental distinction between an additive and enriching acritical 
position and a subtractive, desiccating negative position” (Noys, 2012: 90). This opposition 
leads to him constructing a picture of theoretical work that has become engaged in “critical 
barbarity” (Latour, 2004: 242), mired in language games, and debunks for the sake of 
debunking. It is by drawing this contrast with “other” forms of theoretical criticism that 
Latour is able to present his own approach as more conciliatory with those committed to 
reinstating the authority of expert knowledge through aiming: “no longer […] to debunk but 
to protect and to care” for facts (2004: 232).  
Making this argument does not only, as Noys (2012) argues, homogenize critique. As Puig de 
la Bellacasa suggests in a more sympathetic series of criticisms, Latour’s emphasis on 
“adding” rather than “subtracting” reality can also: “become arguments to moderate a critical 
standpoint. The kind of standpoint that tends to produce divergences and oppositional 
knowledges based on attachments to particular visions” (2011: 91). For Puig de la Bellacasa, 
crucially, the call for moderation that is central to Latour’s work “also exhibits mistrust 
regarding minoritarian and radical ways of politicizing things that tend to focus on exposing 
relations of power and exclusion” (2011: 91). Revisiting these criticisms of Latour’s “critique 
of critique” is important when considering his more recent attempts to craft a moderate third 
path.  
Unlike “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Down to Earth has as its target not a 
particular knowledge politics within cultural theory, but contemporary politics more broadly 
(2018: 2), and it is this that has given the text such currency. The broadened scope and appeal 
of the seemingly moderate path offered by Latour, however, is what makes the ongoing, 
deliberate distancing of “critique” in his call to reclaim common worlds so concerning, in 
light of the way that this stance could inadvertently segue with popular commentaries that 
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have – under the umbrella of postmodernism – criticised commitments to situated 
knowledges.   
The stakes of a renewed critique of critique 
The first tension that emerges from Latour’s recent work is simply an extension of 
longstanding criticisms of Latour that have been articulated by sympathetic commentators 
such as Puig de la Bellacasa, which have been given new resonance. The issue, as she puts it, 
is that the additive approach to describing issues put forward by Latour can become: “a tool 
to oppose descriptions and explanatory strategies that support minoritarian critical stand-
points and visions on power dynamics in technoscience. Those that become identified, for 
instance, to an ‘eulogy of margins’ obsessed with the power of ‘the centre’ or, worst, 
associated to humanistic technophobia” (2011: 91). This form of marginalization is explicit, 
for example in the context of Latour’s figure of the “angry environmental activist,” which he 
uses to illustrate the sort of subtractive critique he condemns.  
As Puig de la Bellacasa elucidates, instead of being critical of polluting technologies (for 
instance) Latour asserts that it is important to care about them and better understand the 
networks of entangled concerns, values, materials, and all manner of other actors that bring 
these technologies into being. For Latour: “it is not a technology that is unethical if it fails or 
becomes a monster, but rather to stop caring about it, to abandon it as Dr Frankenstein 
abandoned his creation … we must take care of things in order to remain responsible for their 
becomings” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011: 90). A corollary of this argument, Puig de la 
Bellacasa points out, is Latour’s suggestion that it is equally important to resist condemning 
those who produce damaging technologies, as: “if we really want to affect their use we must 
also engage with the concerns that animate those who support them” (2011: 90). Though 
broadly sympathetic to Latour’s additive approach, Puig de la Bellacasa is nonetheless 
intensely critical of the way it excludes “minoritarian and radical ways of politicizing things 
that tend to focus on exposing relations of power and exclusion” (2011: 91). Indeed, it is in 
order to redress the foreclosure of critical voices in Latour’s approach that develops her own 
influential re-working of “matters of concern” – “matters of care” – that pay attention to 
“those who can be harmed by an assemblage but whose voices are less valued” (2011: 192).   
Puig de la Bellacasa’s arguments gain heightened significance in relation to Down to Earth’s 
renewed critique of critique. Here too, perspectives that attend to other forms of inequality 
are in danger of being foreclosed due to the particular knowledge politics Latour is 
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advocating. Again the project he advocates is a descriptive one, but this time one that calls for 
further attention to the environmental and geological conditions that enable particular (human 
and non-human) entities to survive on a planet that is undergoing a period of environmental 
crisis. For Latour it is this project of, firstly, identifying these conditions for survival and, 
secondly, cultivating these conditions, which can offer a new horizon to orient contemporary 
politics, “pursuing an exhaustive search for everything that makes subsistence possible” 
(2018: 96). To undertake this descriptive task, however, it is necessary to move beyond not 
both existing theoretical categories of analysis, such as concern with political economy, but 
existing political categories such as the “affect-laden terms” of “‘Right’ and ‘Left,’ 
‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’” (2018: 49) in order to find ways of working together.      
What is notable in the contemporary political context is this framing of critique as a 
destructive distraction from the “real” issues has been echoed in popular science 
commentaries. In such contexts, however, it is not the angry environmentalist, but the well-
worn trope of the angry feminist or indeed angry feminist of colour (see Ahmed, 2017), who 
is a pervasive target of criticism. Here feminist and postcolonial scholarship, which has 
sought to identify structural bias within particular institutional or socio-technical 
arrangements, has itself been framed as a product of bias that distorts or undermines 
seemingly self-evident facts. The most well-known example of this framing of critical 
thought, the aforementioned Sokal Squared attack on humanities and social science research, 
for instance, specifically targeted what the hoaxers describe as “grievance studies”: an 
umbrella term for “(feminist) gender studies, masculinities studies, queer studies, sexuality 
studies, psychoanalysis, critical race theory, critical whiteness theory, fat studies, sociology, 
and educational philosophy” that (allegedly) reflect “radically skeptical and standpoint 
epistemologies rooted in postmodernism, feminist and critical race epistemology” (Lindsay, 
Boghossian and Pluckrose, 2018). Though Sokal Squared might be the most prominent 
instance of such a framing, similar tendencies exist in broader popular commentaries about 
post-truth. Malik’s critique, for instance, directly targets what he describes as the “epistemic 
relativism” created by “postmodernism,” arguing that it speaks to:  
…a hostility to the Enlightenment project of creating a universal outlook from 
fragmented experiences, of giving coherence to our observations of the social and 
natural world. Since no human possesses a ‘God’s eye’ view, postmodernists 
argue, so every human can speak only from within a particular perspective, a 
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perspective informed by specific experience, culture and identity. ‘Truth’ is 
necessarily local, and specific to particular communities or cultures. (Malik, 2017) 
To illustrate this point, he cites feminist scholar Sandra Harding, particularly her argument 
that: “All knowledge systems, including those of modern science, are local ones.” Criticism 
of Harding then underpins the argument that: “The acceptance of such views has gone hand-
in-hand with the rise of identity politics.” The use of this particular example could in part be 
explained by Malik’s disciplinary background and existing familiarity with STS, but the 
performative significance of holding up Harding is nonetheless significant; again, it is not just 
critique in general but specific strands of critique (namely those associated with feminist and 
postcolonial commitments) that rendered especially culpable for eroding faith in the facts.  
It is this political backdrop that is so worrying in light of Latour framing his present stance as 
an apology, which recompenses for his prior contribution to destabilizing expert knowledge. 
The headlines and commentaries of Down to Earth referred to above speak to this point (see 
also Giraud, ref): the text is presented as departing from the previous “corrosive critique” of 
knowledge production that characterized the science wars, with Latour recast as a “veteran” 
shifting from the wrong to the right side in this battle by now “coming to [science’s] defense” 
(de Vrieze, 2017). This framing effectively legitimizes the attacks on marginal standpoints 
that are occurring more widely in popular commentaries by positioning particular strands of 
work – specifically those with feminist and anti-racist commitments – as indeed being 
responsible for the relativistic excesses they are currently being accused of elsewhere.  
Additional stakes of a narrative where Latour is (self-)represented as shifting allegiances can 
be elucidated on turning to the warnings Angela Willey has levelled at new materialist work 
for making a parallel argument about its own conceptual commitments. New materialism, 
Willey argues, often self-narrativizes the origins of the field by telling a story of a gradual 
evolution: from theoretical work that is simply deconstructive and critical of scientific 
knowledge, to work that is reconciliatory, interdisciplinary, and actively builds on the 
insights of the natural sciences in developing its own conceptual stance (2016: 995). This 
story, however, relies on reasserting lineages with feminist figures who lend themselves more 
readily to a reconciliatory position (such as Donna Haraway and Karen Barad) while cutting 
away others whose postcolonial feminist position fits less neatly with contemporary new 
materialist aspirations (notably Sandra Harding). The issue with this form of disciplinary 
storytelling, Willey argues, is that it ultimately re-centres a particular way of knowing and 
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results in a “strange reinvigoration of the nature/culture binary in the framing of ‘the 
material’ as an object best accessed through (scientific) disciplinary apparatuses” (2016: 
995).  
To reiterate the problem: As Willey and others have pointed out, this positioning of new 
materialisms as somehow overcoming the critical excesses of poststructuralism, by 
reconciling with recent work in the natural sciences, is a pervasive narrative. The danger of 
this narrative is that it valorises particular ways of knowing as being productive of “truth” in 
a manner that makes it difficult to open space to ask the questions about how these 
knowledges are implemented (as called for by Raman), or create space to include divergent 
perspectives when exploring these questions (in line with Puig de la Bellacasa), let alone 
recognize that alternative epistemologies might exist (as central to Harding’s standpoint 
epistemology). While all of these concerns are applicable to Latour’s recent work, it is this 
last point about the foreclosure of divergent epistemologies that deserves further attention in 
relation to the structure of Latour’s arguments in Down to Earth, where his focus on the earth 
itself – what he terms “the Terrestrial” – as a new political orientation, is in danger of 
rendering critical perspectives as not just irrelevant but out of touch with reality. 
Centring the terrestrial, foreclosing other worlds   
The problems identified by Willey are given particular resonance in light of criticisms of the 
“material turn” that have been articulated by Indigenous feminist thinkers. Kim TallBear 
(2017), for instance, argues that in new materialist thought it is often asserted that: “to really 
grasp the nature of and potential solutions for the world’s most critical problems, including 
environmental degradation, climate change, poverty, systemic violence, and warfare, 
nonhumans in all their myriad forms must be given their due” (2017: 190). In presenting 
these binaries as universals that need to be challenged, however, this body of work obscures 
their embeddedness in particular settler-colonialist ways of understanding the world. As 
TallBear argues, “new materialists may take the intellectual intervention that grounds the 
vital-materialist creed as something new in the world. But the fundamental insights are not 
new for everyone” (2017: 199). Zoe Todd underlines this point in relation to Latour 
specifically: “here we were celebrating and worshipping a European thinker for 
‘discovering’, or newly articulating by drawing on a European intellectual heritage, what 
many an Indigenous thinker around the world could have told you for millennia: the climate 
is a common organizing force!” (Todd, 2016: 8; emphasis in original). 
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The dangers that are pointed to here – that calls to reject bifurcations between nature and 
culture inadvertently re-centralize Anglo-European traditions of thought, even as they claim 
to do the opposite – are compounded by Latour’s argument that it is the material world itself 
that has given rise to epistemic upheaval in this particular moment (a point reinscribed by his 
still more recent call for a physical sociology).7 In Down to Earth Latour argues that 
environmental crises play a constitutive role in the contemporary political situation (2018: 
44), with Trumpism marking the culmination of a politics that emerged in the 1980s wherein 
the actions of the wealthy are oriented not toward preserving the conditions that can sustain 
planetary life in general, but giving up on this possibility by retreating into enclaves (see 
Giraud, ref). In order to signify both the urgency of the situation and need to move beyond 
existing critical framworks, Latour names the contemporary political situation as 
“unprecedented” (2018: 44). More specifically, he labels that vacuity of this situation as 
unprecedented because Trumpism has constructed a new political horizon, one “of people 
who no longer belong to an earth that would react to their actions” (2018: 34-5). He describes 
this horizon as a “New Climatic Regime” that is marked by a “headlong rush to maximum 
profit” by continuing to expand industry, exploit ecological resources, and contribute to 
carbon emissions (2018: 35).  
What masks the attendant inequalities associated with this regime is that this push to 
relentlessly expand global networks of capital is coupled with calls to halt the global 
movement of people in a simultaneous “headlong rush backward of an entire people toward 
the return of national and ethnic categories” (2018: 35). Here xenophobia that has been seen 
as a hallmark of Trumpism (Kellner, 2016) is portrayed as the product of material conditions 
that have been fostered not by economic relations but by the Earth itself. As a result, these 
relations cannot be analysed through the lens of political economy and conventional ideology 
critique is inadequate. Due to framing racialized anti-migration rhetoric as masking economic 
conditions, Latour argues that such approaches miss the ecological constitution of the crisis 
(hence his suggestion that historical materialists need to “try a little harder” (2018: 64) to 
engage with materiality itself). Instead he argues that the rush to profit relies on masking the 
material climatic conditions that are unleashed by profit-making activities; capitalist 
expansion in the contemporary moment is “based on the systematic denial that climate 
change exists” (2018: 34). This insistence on the geological as the driving force behind 
Trumpism is why: “It is quite useless to become outraged on the pretext that Trump voters 
‘don’t believe in facts.’ They are not stupid: it is because the overall geopolitical situation has 
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to be denied that indifference to the facts becomes so essential” (2018: 37). Post-truth, from 
this perspective, is not about simple disinformation or even symptom of a broader decline in 
faith in expert knowledge, but “the end of a politics oriented around an identifiable goal. 
Trumpian politics is not ‘post-truth,’ it is post-politics – that is, literally, a politics with no 
object, since it rejects the world that it claims to inhabit’ (2018: 38). 
Latour’s concern, then, is with how the Terrestrial itself has been denied in contemporary 
politics. His call to come “down to earth” is both a diagnosis of this problem and an argument 
that renewed engagement with the Terrestrial offers an orientation for politics that can 
navigate environmental and political crises alike. Claims that the contemporary 
environmental crises are “unprecedented,” however, carry a fraught politics and need to be 
set against broader debates about the labelling of the contemporary moment as the sixth great 
extinction. As Kathryn Yusoff argues in the opening pages of A Billion Black Anthropocenes 
or None:  
The Anthropocene might seem to offer a dystopic future that laments the end of 
the world, but imperialism and ongoing (settler) colonialisms have been ending 
worlds for as long as they have been in existence. The Anthropocene as a 
politically infused geology and scientific/popular discourse is just now noticing 
the extinction it has chosen to continually overlook in the making of its modernity 
and freedom. (2018: xiii)  
What is brought to the fore in Yusoff’s arguments is the question “unprecedented for whom?” 
This concern has been echoed in prominent debates about the naming of the current moment 
as the Anthropocene, with alternative labels – capitalocene (Moore, 2017), plantationocene 
(Tsing, 2015) – put forward to reflect the way that it is not people in general who are 
responsible, but particular ways of living. This is not just a debate over nomenclature but 
holds significance both because of the uneven distribution of responsibility for contemporary 
environmental crisis and the uneven distribution of vulnerability to this crisis – where 
colonial histories have created legacies of environmental toxicity, which are in turn 
imbricated in contemporary inequalities – what Yusoff (2018) describes as the colour line of 
the Anthropocene. In suggesting that the climate is the organizing force in this moment, 
which necessitates political differences being put aside, Latour’s appeals to the Terrestrial are 
in danger not only of overshadowing these colonial histories but make it difficult to attend to 
their ongoing legacies.      
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Conclusion 
The often fraught debates surrounding post truth have broadened into wider concern about 
the politics of critical thought. In popular and academic commentaries diverse strands of 
critique have been homogenised, classified as epistemic relativism, and held responsible for 
destabilizing public faith in facts and expert knowledge. This framing has, in turn, been 
criticised by those who argue that – far from being culpable for post truth – the strands of 
thought that are routinely condemned (particularly feminist and postcolonial perspectives) 
offer valuable tools for negotiating the problem. In light of the sometimes circular – or at 
least antagonistic – dynamics of these debates, Latour’s recent work seems to offer a 
promising third path: framing the issue as a more fundamental denial of the materiality of the 
Terrestrial, which needs to be redressed in order to craft not only a shared political 
vocabulary but new ways of sharing the Earth itself.      
In foregrounding continuities between this recent stance and Latour’s previous critique of 
critique, however, we have pointed to particular tensions associated with this stance. 
Although Latour offers an important intervention in elucidating populism’s entanglement 
with environmental degradation, it is vital – to reiterate Puig de la Bellacasa – to recognize 
that: “To promote care in our world we cannot throw out critical standpoints with the 
bathwater of corrosive critique” (2011: 91). This argument is not just an epistemological 
claim about how the inclusion of diverse perspectives can enrich understanding of a given 
phenomenon, but an ethical argument for the importance of engaging with perspectives of 
those who might be harmed by the phenomenon in question. 
While racial and gender inequalities are not wholly neglected by Latour, they are framed as 
the consequences of the New Climatic Regime he identifies rather than constitutive of it. 
Thus although he positions his arguments as holding potential to open space for a multitude 
of voices that have been foreclosed by calls to modernize, in rooting appeals to reclaim a 
common world in a particular conception of the Terrestrial he is in danger of undercutting 
these potentials. If the Earth itself is framed as necessitating a move beyond critique, voices 
that seek to draw attention to ongoing inequalities run the risk of being portrayed as a 
“distorting lens” (as Sara Ahmed puts it in relation accusations levelled at her own critique of 
appeals to pure ontology; 2017: 156-7). More, concern with ongoing racial inequalities and 
xenophobia run the risk of being positioned as epiphenomenon of broader shifts in climate, 
which need to be moved past in the project of developing new horizons. In a context where 
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perspective cast as the most “critical” are also precisely those who are most vulnerable to 
populism’s nationalist “rush backwards,” it is vital to ensure that a critique of critique does 
not naturalize its own exclusions by presenting this approach as the necessary response to 
provocations offered by the Earth itself. 
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1 For critical summaries of this phenomenon, see the October 2017 special edition of Discover Society edited by 
Des Fitzgerald, which gathers together short commentaries about post-truth and critical thought, available from: 
https://discoversociety.org/category/ds49/ 
2 As the above exchanges illustrate, just as email lists fanned the flames of the original science wars, these 
debates have tended to unfold most prominently across blogs and twitter commentaries. Steve Fuller has written 
extensively about the science wars in relation to these dynamics (e.g. Fuller, 1999); for an indicative sense of the 
type of email discussion this generated, see: Sci-Tech-Studies Mailing List (1996) “Science Wars”. Available 
from: https://www.math.tohoku.ac.jp/~kuroki/Sokal/vest_mail-1996.html retrieved 29th November, 2017. 
3 The hoax, dubbed “Sokal Squared” involved a group of academics attempting to replicate the Sokal hoax 
through submitting a series of papers based on falsified data to peer-reviewed journals (see Kafka, 2018). The 
fields focused on in particular were gender and queer studies, an issue discussed in more depth below.   
4 The phrase “Post-Truth Phenomenon” is taken from a teach-out of the same name at Cambridge University 
(15th-17th March, 2018), convened by Ella McPherson, Mara Polgovsky Ezcurra and Devika Ranjan. 
5 These observations were made by McPherson during a paper at the British Sociological Association annual 
conference, 24th-26th April, 2019.  
6 The phrase “Trump bump” refers to the boost in readership for news sources that were perceived as “reliable” 
in the wake of Trump’s presidency. 
7 Though Latour’s calls for a physical sociology are longstanding, he has renewed them in his recent work, as 
elucidated on his Modes of Existence website, see: http://modesofexistence.org/ 
